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NOTES AND COMMENTS
JuDcIALL RE-EXAMINATION or FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES
It was to be expected that repercussions of the decision in Williams
v. North Carolina' would be felt in the courts dealing with divorce
cases. It was not expected, however, that it would so soon produce the
varied reaction that has been demonstrated by two recent decisions. In
one of them, that of Stephens v. Stephens, 2 the Illinois Appellate Court
for the Second District, one judge dissenting, recently came to the con-
clusion that a foreign divorce decree that is prima facie valid where
granted must be accorded full faith and credit in this state.3 As a
consequence, a decree rejecting a defense based on such foreign di-
vorce was reversed since the majority of the reviewing court felt the
decision in the Williams case made it mandatory upon the court to give
recognition to the foreign decree and the jurisdictional findings therein.
In the other, that of Bowditch v. Bowditch,4 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts came to an exactly opposite conclusion and ap-
proved the conduct of the trial court in overruling a plea in abatement
based upon a decree of divorce granted by another state. The decision in
the Williams case was also invoked by the appellant therein, but the
court held it did not prevent inquiry into the jurisdictional basis of the
foreign decree. 5
Problems arising from migratory divorces are not new to the
courts, 6 but the decision in Haddock v. Haddock7 left each state free to
settle for itself the validity of the foreign decree so far as its own resi-
dents were concerned. On previous occasions the Illinois courts, settling
the policy of this state, have recognized such decrees even though
based on substituted service, provided the plaintiff was domiciled in a
1 317 U. S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. (adv.) 189, 143 A.L.R. 1273 (1942), noted
in 31 Calif. L. Rev. 167, 18 Ind. L.J. 165, 7 Md. L. Rev. 29, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1013,
15 Miss. L.J. 165. 17 St. John's L. Rev. 87. and 52 Yale L.J. 341.
2 319 ll. App. 292, 49 N.E. (2d) 560 (1943). Dove, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
3 Plaintiff therein sought annulment on the ground of prior marriage undis-
solved. Defendant relied on a Nevada divorce. Plaintiff contended the divorce was
invalid. Service in the Nevada case was based on publication. The decree itself
recited that plaintiff had been a bona fide resident of the state for the requisite
period and that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.
4 -Mass.-, 50 N.E. (2d) 65 (1943).
5 Similar holdings appear in the lower courts of New York of which the follow-
ing are but illustrative: Oberlander v. Oberlander, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 139 (1943); Jira-
nek v. Jiranek, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 523 (1943); In re Bingham's Will, 39 N.Y.S. (2d)
756 (1943); McKee v. McKee, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 859 (1943); McCarthy v. McCarthy;
39 N.Y.S. (2d) 922 (1943); Schnabel v. Schnabel, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 972 (1943);
Meyers v. Meyers, 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 444 (1943); Reese v. Reese, 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 468
(1943); Standish v. Standish, 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 538 (1943). See also Commonwealth v.
Allison, 151 Pa. Super. 369, 30 A. (2d) 365 (1943).
6 In general, see 2 Law and Cont. Prob., pp. 289-400.
7 201 U. S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1 (1906).
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bona fide fashion in the state issuing the decree.8 But our courts, prior
to the holding mentioned above, have not felt themselves bound either
by the declaration of the other court that it possessed jurisdiction or
that the plaintiff's domicile was sufficient to support that fact.9 Instead,
it has been held that inquiry into the facts of the foreign divorce pro-
ceeding to determine whether jurisdiction had been properly acquired
was highly proper, even though the decree might recite that jurisdiction
existed. 10 The decision in the Stephens case, then, represents a clear
departure from what had been the announced policy of this state.
Justification for such departure was said to be based entirely on the
Williams case," but it is doubtful if such a pronounced change was
required thereby. This state would have no quarrel with that part
thereof which overruled the Haddock case since, as was pointed out
above, this state has given full faith and credit to every foreign divorce
decree where the plaintiff was, in fact, a bona fide resident.12 But beyond
overruling the Haddock case, and thereby affecting only those juris-
dictions which followed the rule thereof, the United States Supreme
Court did not venture to go. The court therein clearly did not touch
upon the question as to whether the courts of one state were bound by
the declaration of the foreign court that it possessed proper jurisdiction,
nor did it say they were prevented from inquiring into the facts to deter-
mine whether jurisdiction had been properly acquired.
It should be remembered that the original judgment in the Williams
case was based upon a general verdict of a jury which had been
charged not only on the issue of domicile but also on the question of the
failure of due process because the divorce was based on substituted
service. It was on this latter issue that the court predicated error but
felt itself obliged to reverse because a general verdict had been taken.
Concerning the immediate problem, the court said: ". . . we cannot avoid
meeting the Haddock issue in this case by saying that the petitioners
acquired no bona fide domicile in Nevada. If the case had been tried
and submitted on that issue only we would have quite a different prob-
lem ... We have no occasion to meet that issue now and we intimate no
opinion on it."' 3 In Bell v. Bell,14 however, the court had decided that
8 Rendleman v. Rendleman, 118 Ill. 257, 8 N.E. 773 (1886); Chamblin v. Cham-
blin, 362 IlM. 588, 1 N.E. (2d) 73 (1936).
9 Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N.E. 841 (1896), affirming 57 Ill. App. 475
(1895); Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496, 74 N.E. 443 (1905); Forrest v. Fey, 218 Ill. 165,
75 N.E. 789 (1905); Wynn v. Wynn, 254 IMI. App. 254 (1929); Janssen v. Janssen,
269 IlM. App. 233 (1933), cert. den. 269 IlM. App. xiv; Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill.
App. 152, 9 N.E. (2d) 645 (1937); Grein v. Grein, 303 Ill. App. 398, 25 N.E. (2d)
409 (1940).
10 See, for example, Grein v. Grein, 303 II. App. 398, 25 N.E. (2d) 409 (1940).
11 In fact, it was the only case cited by the majority.
12 See cases listed in note 8, ante.
Is 317 U. S. 287 at -, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. (adv.) 189 at 192.
14 181 U. S. 175, 21 S.Ct. 551, 45 L. Ed. 804 (1901). See also Thormann v. Frame,
176 U. S. 350, 20 S.Ct. 446, 44 L. Ed. 500 (1900).
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the local court was free to conduct its own investigation of the juris-
dictional facts and it was careful, in the Williams case, to avoid any
imputation that such decision was overruled. 15 In fact, when consider-
ing the nature of a divorce proceeding, the court said: "Such a suit,
however, is not a mere in personam action. Domicile of the plaintiff,
immaterial in a personal action, is . . . essential in order to give the
court jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to extraterritorial
effect, at least when the defendant has been neither personally served
nor entered an appearance."' 16 So strongly did the court seem to feel on
this point that it also stated: "Nor do we reach here the question as to
the power of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada
divorce decrees because, contrary to the finding of the Nevada court,
North Carolina finds that no bona fide domicile was acquired in
Nevada."' 71 Certainly, then, the Williams case affords no true basis for
so drastic a departure from precedent.
The majority of the court in the Stephens case appears to have
been blinded by the general statement that a judgment which is binding
where rendered is equally binding in every other state' s by reason of
the "full faith and credit" clause of the federal constitution.' 9 No court,
however, has ever deemed itself precluded from determing whether, in
fact, the foreign judgment was "binding where renderd,' 02° and there
is nothing in the constitutional mandate which forbids such inquiry. It is
only the valid judgment to which full faith and credit must be given,
and no state court should, by its self-serving declaration that jurisdiction
was obtained, be able to bind the courts of the sister states to enforce
that which is invalid. Since invalidity may not clearly appear, inquiry
into that fact becomes not only necessary but vitally important in order
that the true purpose of the "full faith and credit" clause may be vindi-
cated. If the Nevada decree in the Stephens case was fraudulently ob-
tained on a false claim of domicile, neither constitutional requirement
nor anything said by the United States Supreme Court requires an
Illinois court to stultify itself by giving recognition thereto without even
an inquiry into the facts. The Williams case does not so require and,
unless the courts of this state wish to extend the doctrine thereof beyond
its present scope and to abandon their own prior holdings, the decision of
the lower court in the Stephens case should have been affirmed.
W. F. ZACRAUAS
15 Such was also the view of the dissenting judge in Stephens v. Stephens. See
319 IM. App. 292 at 298, 49 N.E. (2d) 560 at 562.
16 317 U. S. 287 at -, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. (adv.) 189 at 195.
17 317 U. S. 287 at--, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. (adv.) 189 at 197.
Is See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 at -, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. (adv.) 189 at 199.
19 U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 1.
20 In general, see Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 429, 430 and 112.
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CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHmENT--PERsONS AND PROPERTY SUBJECT TO
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHmVENT-WHETHER oR Nor ATTACHMENT AND GAR-
NISHMENT MAY BE MAINTAINED IN ILLINOIS UPON EQUITABLE CLAIMS NOT YET
REDUCED TO JUDGMENr OR DEcnRF-In Dunham v. Kauffman,1 the lessor's
successor filed a complaint in chancery against certain non-resident
legatees of the deceased lessee to recover rent and taxes which had
accrued under the terms of the lease after the administration of the estate
of the deceased lessee. The purpose of the action was to subject the
assets received by the defendants, as such legatees, to the claim for the
unpaid rent and taxes. Four days after the suit was begun, plaintiff filed
an affidavit for attachment and the writ was served on the trustees under
the last will and testament of the deceased lessee. They answered the
plaintiff's interrogatories by stating that they held certain assets in trust
upon certain contingencies which had not yet occurred, but that they
also possessed a specified sum of accumulated income due to the de-
fendants as beneficiaries of the trust. The trustees prayed the direction
of the court as to whether the attachment was proper or not. The trial
court, finding that no judgment had been rendered upon the major claim
against the legatees, directed the trustees to pay said sum to the bene-
ficiaries and thereby, in effect, quashed the garnishment proceedings.
Upon plaintiff's appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
reversed the decision and held that attachment or garnishment would lie
in an original proceeding in equity even though the claim of the plaintiff
was based on a money demand and had not been reduced to judgment.
The early Illinois cases consistently announced the proposition that
an equitable attachment proceeding could not be maintained, and that
rendition of a final judgment and return of execution unsatisfied was
essential before the creditor could appeal for equitable relief, since
without these, he had failed to establish the inadequacy of his legal
remedy.2 This was so, even though the only asset of the debtor consisted
of an equitable estate not subject to ordinary execution.3 Of course,
after an equitable claim had been established by decree, attachment
1 319 Ill. App. 229, 48 N.E. (2d) 777 (1943). Matchett, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion relying partly on the fact that recognition of equitable attachments
amounted to judicial legislation, and partly on the ground that no final appeal-
able order had been entered.
2 Miller v. Davidson, 8 Ill. (3 Gil.) 518 (1846); Phelps v. Foster, 18 l. 309 (1857).
3 See, for example, Birney v. Solomon, 348 IM. 410, 181 N.E. 318 (1932); Ladd v.
Judson, 174 Ill. 344, 51 N.E. 838 (1898); Lewis v. West Side Trust & Savings Bank,
288 Ill. App. 271, 6 N.E. (2d) 481 (1937); Pearson v. Tucson Farms Co., 204 Ill.
App. 276 (1917). In Brockway v. Kizer, 122 l. App. 567 (1905), the court held
that the allegation that plaintiff had no remedy at law was insufficient unless sup-
ported by the further allegation that the claim had been reduced to judgment
which remained unsatisfied.
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and garnishment proceedings were available to enforce collection of the
money award therein found to be due.4 An exception has been developed
in cases where the complainant showed that his demand was of such
character that it could only be established in an equitable proceeding,
as in cases of trusts and the like, 5 and requires immediate protection to
remove the fund from abuse. 6 It does not, however, extend to cases
where unsecured creditors seek to have equitable assets sequestered
pending an accounting, 7 or where, in a case like the present one, the
plaintiff's demand is a simple money one but which must be litigated in
equity in order to reach assets in the hands of legatees after administra-
tion has been completed.8
The remedy originally provided by the Attachments Act 9 was in-
tended to apply in cases where the plaintiff's demand was actionable in
law as by way of assumpsit, debt, covenant, trespass, or trespass on
the case.10 Such statutory remedy could hardly have been applicable to
equitable claims, but in 1935 the legislature amended the statute by
deleting such limitation, and substituted in lieu thereof the words: "...
a creditor having a money claim, whether liquidated or unliquidated,
and whether sounding in contract or tort, may have an attachment
against the property of his debtor .... ,,1 At the same time, the practice
provisions were amended to conform the procedure in attachment cases
as nearly as possible to those controlling other civil actions.12 Though
not expressly providing for the use of attachment in equitable cases, a
liberal construction of the amended statute would permit the inference
that the remedy provided thereby has been expanded to cover such cases
since the controlling test of the right to attach appears to be simply
that the creditor must have "a money claim." Though most such claims
will be actionable at law, some money claims must, as in the instant
case, be presented in equity.
It might be argued that, as the Attachments Act is in derogation of
the common law, it should be strictly construed so as to permit no im-
4 Farnsworth v. Strasler, 12 Ill. 482 (1851); Weightman v. Hatch. 17 IlL 281
(1855). See also Getzler v. Saroni, 18 II. 511 (1857).
5 Ladd v. Judson, 174 Ill. 344, 51 N.E. 838 (1898); Dormueil v. Ward, 108 IL
216 (1883); Pearson v. Tucson Farms Co., 204 IlM. App. 276 (1917). The case of
Gore v. Kramer, 117 Ill. 176, 7 N.E. 504 (1886), contains an intimation along the
same line.
6 Miller v. Davidson, 8 Ill. (3 Gil.) 518 (1846).
7 Pearson v. Tucson Farms Co., 204 Ill. App. 276 (1917).
8 Union Trust Co. v. Shoemaker, 258 Ill. 564, 101 N.E. 1050 (1913).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 11.
10 Originally limited by R.S. 1845, p. 70, § 30, to actions of "debt, covenant or
trespass, or on the case upon promises," the use of attachment was enlarged, in
1893, to cover "assumpsit, debt, covenant, trespass, or trespass on the case." See
Laws, 1893, p. 74, § 1. As so amended, the statute stood unchanged until the
revision in 1935.
11 Laws, 1935, p. 210, Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 11, 1 1.
12 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 11, 1 26.
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plications other than those essential to effectuate the legislative intent.
Cases do exist in which such views have been expressed, but all such
cases involve jurisdictional points hence warrant that attitude.13 When
the jurisdictional elements have been satisfied, the act has been given
liberal interpretation, 14 and though there has been no complete fusion
between law and equity in Illinois, 15 there is no sound reason for permit-
ting attachment in one type of remedy and denying it in another. It has
been granted on equitable claims in other jurisdictions, 16 and, if the
decision in the instant case should stand, it is now made available in such
cases in Illinois. J. J. BuEc E
GARIsHmENT--EXTENT OF LIABILITY OF INsURER-WHETHER OR Nor
LIABILITY OF INSURER UNDER PoLicy IS AFFECTED BY PENDENCY OF APPEAL FROM
JUDGMENT AGAINST Tm INsURED - A judgment had been rendered in favor
of plaintiff, as administrator, for the wrongful death of his decedent.
The judgment debtor appealed therefrom, but failed to file a supersedeas
bond. During the pendency of such appeal, the plaintiff instituted a
garnishment action against an insurance company to reach the proceeds
of an automobile liability policy which it had issued to the judgment
debtor's father.' Although informed that an appeal on the major judgment
was still pending, the trial court entered judgment against the insurance
company garnishee to the full extent of the policy limits. On appeal
therefrom, the judgment was reversed in Ancateau, for Use of
Trust Company of Chicago v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company2
on the ground that the garnishment action was premature since the insur-
ed's liability had not been "finally determined" within the meaning of
language contained in the policy.3
is Rabbitt v. Frank C. Weber & Co., 297 Ill. 491, 130 N.E. 787 (1921); Haywood
v. Collins, 60 Ill. 328 (1871); Dennison v. Blumenthal, 37 IL. App. 385 (1890).
14 Luton v. Hoehn, 72 Ill. 81 (1874); Weightman v. Hatch, 17 IMI. 281 (1855).
15 Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 34 N.E. (2d) 424 (1941), noted in 19 CmcIw-
KENT LAw REvirw 372.
16 In California, under a statute permitting attachment on claims arising out
of contract "express or implied," in the case of Stanford Hotel Co. v. M.
Schwind Co., 180 Cal. 348, 181 P. 780 (1919); in Tennessee, under a statute ex-
pressly sanctioning such process, in New York Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 160 Tenn.
329, 24 S.W. (2d) 881 (1930); and in Washington, absent any specific statute, in
State v. Superior Court, 115 Wash. 359, 197 P. 321 (1921).
1 Suit on the policy was maintained on the theory that it covered the liability
of the judgment debtor as an additional person insured thereby. The insurance
company had defended the wrongful death action under a non-waiver agreement
more commonly known as a "reservation of rights" agreement. It was probably
for this reason that the company did not supply the appeal bond which, if it had
been presented, would have prevented the litigation in the instant case.
2 318 Ill. App. 553, 48 N.E. (2d) 440 (1943). Disposition of the appeal in the action
for wrongful death may be found in Trust Co. of Chicago v. Ancateau, 317 Ill.
App. 186, 46 N.E. (2d) 125 (1943).
s The policy contained the standard clause in current form adopted by the
National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters, prepared by the Insurance
Section of the American Bar Association, which reads: "No action shall lie
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While an appeal from a judgment, according to the Illinois Civil
Practice Act, is a "continuation of the proceeding in the court below,"
4
the fact that an appeal is pending does not deprive the trial court of the
right to enforce its judgment by execution unless a bond has been filed
and approved in accordance with Section 82 thereof,5 in which case the
appeal operates as a supersedeas. In so far as the judgment debtor in
the instant case was concerned, the trial court was entitled to attempt
the collection of the original judgment from his property since no bond
had been supplied as required by statute. 6 Had third persons acquired
rights as purchasers at execution sale thereunder, they would have been
protected by Section 76 of the Civil Practice Act.7 So far as the judg-
ment debtor and such purchasers are concerned, then, the judgment
must be regarded as final, even though, in fact, an appeal be pending
and the judgment be later reversed.
Involved in the instant case, however, is the problem of whether or
not such judgment is final so far as a garnishee is concerned. In this
respect the court stated that the question was one "seemingly of first
impression in this State,"'8 but came to the conclusion that before garnish-
ment would lie, the judgment must be such that either no action has
been taken to review the same, or the parties no longer have the right
to the review thereof. It is fundamental that, to support garnishment,
the creditor must have secured a judgment against the debtor. 9 If such
judgment be vacated, the uncompleted garnishment proceedings will
collapse therewith,' 0 and if such judgment has become no longer enfor-
cible, as by lapse of time, it will not serve as the foundation for a
garnishment action." The same result will be achieved if the major
judgment be void. 12 But the only requirements for garnishment imposed
by statute are that "a judgment shall be rendered" by a court of record,
and that execution thereon shall be returned "no property found."' 13 It
would seem, therefore, as if the court, by its decision in the instant
case, is imposing an additional requirement to the maintenance of gar-
nishment proceedings, to-wit: that the judgment be a "final" one in the
ultimate sense of that term.
Such requirement has, apparently, been imposed by the decisions of
against the company unless as a condition precedent thereto . . . the amount of
the Insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by
judgment against the Insured after an actual trial or by the written agreement
of the Insured, the claimant and the company."
4 IM. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 198(1).
5 ll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 206.
6 318 Il. App. 553 at 556, 48 N.E. (2d) 440 at 442.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
8 318 Ill. App. 553 at 559, 48 N.E. (2d) 440 at 443.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 62, § 1. See also First Nat. Bank v. Habnemann Insti-
tutions, 356 Ill. 366, 190 N.E. 707 (1934).
10 Am. Exchange Nat. Bank v. Moxley, 50 Ill. App. 314 (1893); Genden v.
Bailen, 275 Ill. App. 382 (1934). 11 Pierce v. Wade, 19 Ill. App. 185 (1885).
12 Kirk v. Elmer H. Dearth Agency, 171 Ill. 207, 49 N.E. 413 (1897); Pierce v.
Carleton, 12 Ill. 358 (1851). 13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 62, § 1.
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other states on the theory that an appeal deprives the judgment of its
finality so as to leave the creditor as though possessed of but a simple
claim in contract or tort.14 Examination of such cases, however, dis-
closes either that the judgment debtor had furnished an appeal bond
so as to make the appeal operate as a supersedeas, 15 or, at least, that
the record was silent on the point.' 6 In only one case does it affirma-
tively appear that no bond had been supplied, 17 though the California
court therein did apply the rule achieved by the instant case. Such
slender support tends to cast some doubt on the wisdom of the holding
in the instant case if it serves to create an additional requirement for
garnishment actions.
The outcome of the case could have been more readily supported
had the court concluded that the garnishment action was premature
because, as between judgment debtor and garnishee, the latter was not
then "indebted" to the judgment debtor within the meaning of the
Garnishment Act. It is fundamental that, in order for indebtedness to be
subject to garnishment, it must be owing without uncertainty or contin-
gency.' 8 In the instant case, the insurance company's obligation was to
pay only when "the amount of the insured's obligation shall have been
finally determined by judgment . . . after actual trial or by written
agreement." Until either of these eventualities, no debt had arisen.
In that regard the case of Roberts v. Central Mutual Insurance Com-
pany19 is significant and may well raise a question as to whether or
not the instant case is one of first impression. The facts therein were
much the same as in the instant case, except that the suit against the
insurance company was based on a bond furnished by a cab company,
pursuant to statute, given to indemnify successful plaintiffs securing
final judgments against it for personal injuries sustained. The phrase
"final judgment" as used in the bond and in the statute was held to
mean a judgment which the parties no longer had a right to have
reviewed rather than one on which an appeal would lie. The court therein
pointed out that any other construction would result in absurdity, since
"if the court of review should reverse the judgment on the grounds no
liability was shown, then the action on the bond would likewise fail and
yet as in this case, the defendant would be put to the necessity of
preventing the judgment on the bond from becoming final during the
pendency of the appeal in the other case."'20 The action on the bond
was, therefore, dismissed as being prematurely brought.
14 Arp v. Blake, 63 Cal. App. 362, 218 P. 773 (1923).
15 Waples-Platter Grocer Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 95 Tex. 486, 68 S.W. 265,
59 L.R.A. 353 (1902); Kreisle v. Campbell, (Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S.W. 581 (1895).
16 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Nakano, 12 Cal. (2d) 711, 87 P. (2d) 700, 121
A.L.R. 417 (1939); Arp v. Blake, 63 Cal. App. 362, 218 P. 773 (1923).
17 Jennings v. Ward, 114 CaL App. 536, 300 P. 129 (1931).
18 Capes v. Burgess, 135 Ill. 61, 25 N.E. 1000 (1890); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Connor, 20 Ill. App. 297 (1886).
19 285 Ill. App. 408, 2 N.E. (2d) 132 (1936).
20 285 I3L App. 408 at 414, 2 N.E. (2d) 132 at 134 (1936).
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The same conclusion has been reached in New York, 21 California, 22
and Arkansas, 23 though cases do exist with an apparently contrary hold-
ing. In Kentucky, for example, it has been held that garnishment would
lie despite the pendency of an appeal on the major judgment, but the
decision may be explained on the ground that the insurance company had
waived the benefit of the "no action" clause by failing to file an appeal
bond required of it by the terms of the policy. 2 4 An apparently contrary
Washington case may be likewise explained on the ground that the policy
provisions did not require the final determination made necessary by the
wording of the policy in the instant case. 25 It is also interesting to note
that where an insurance company has furnished a supersedeas bond to
the extent of its liability under the policy, garnishment has been denied
while that appeal is pending, despite the fact that the major judgment
was in excess of the policy limits. 26 At least a portion thereof was not
affected by the supersedeas bond, hence could be said to constitute an
indebtedness.
There is no doubt that the rights of the injured party under the
21 In Schroeder v. Columbia Casualty Co., 213 N.Y.S. 649 (1925), no bond was
filed on appeal from the tort judgment, but, in holding the action premature,
the court stated: ". . . the 'liability imposed by law,' provided for in the policy,
has not yet been fixed, and will not be so fixed until all appeals the defendant
sees fit to take have been finally determined." See 213 N.Y.S. 649 at 652.
22 Jennings v. Ward, 114 Cal. App. 536, 300 P. 129 (1931). The policy therein
provided that: "No action shall lie against the company ... unless brought after
the amount of such claim or loss shall have been fixed and rendered certain ...
by final judgment against the Assured after trial of the issue ....
23 Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Fordyce, 64 Ark. 174, 41 S.W. 420 (1897). The
policy therein lacked the usual "no action" clause, but provided for payment to
the insured of all sums "as the insured may become liable for in damages." No
supersedeas bond had been filed when appeal from the tort judgment was taken.
24 Consolidated Underwriters v. Richards' Adm'r, 276 Ky. 275, 124 S.W. (2d)
54 (1939). The policy provided that: "No action shall lie . . . unless brought after
the amount of such claim or loss shall have been fixed ... by final judgment ...
by the court of last resort after trial of the issue .. " But see Tucker v. State
Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W. (2d) 935, 125 A.L.R. 751 (1939), in
which the "no action" clause was identical to the one in the instant case. The
court made a weak attempt to distinguish the case from that of Consolidated
Underwriters v. Richards' Adm'r on the theory of waiver, but they expressly
quoted with approval from the case of Roberts v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 285 Ill.
App. 408, 2 N.E. (2d) 132 (1936), and concluded that the terms "final judgment"
or "finally determined by judgment" meant a judgment which had become final
by expiration of time for appeal or by affirmance on appeal.
25 Gooschin v. Mercer Casualty Co., 178 Wash. 114, 34 P. (2d) 435 (1934). One
judge concurred in the result but stated that he thought it might have been
better practice for the trial court to proceed with the hearing and thereafter,
instead of entering formal judgment, give the insurance company an oppor-
tunity to deposit the money in court to bide the result of the appeal on the major
claim or in some other way secure payment in case of affirmance. The case of
Materazzi v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 283 N.Y.S. 942 (1935), is explainable
on the same basis.
26 Tucker v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Ky. 212, 132 S.W. (2d) 935
(1939). Contra: McDermott v. Concord Casualty & Surety Co., 265 N.Y.S. 795
(1933).
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policy are no greater than those possessed by the insured.2 7 The latter
would have been unable, in the instant case, to maintain an action thereon
at the time the garnishment proceedings were instituted. Hence it would
seem that the court achieved the right result, but should have predicated
the same on different grounds. W. S. GiroEnar
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 73, §1000, provides that: "... an action may be
maintained by the injured person or his or her personal representative against
such company under the terms of the policy and subject to all the conditions
thereof..... " Italics added. See also Schneider v. Autoist Mutual Ins. Co., 346
I1. 137, 178 N.E. 466 (1931); Scott v. Freeport Motor Casualty Co., 310 IIl. App.
421, 34 N.E. (2d) 879 (1941); Schroeder v. Columbia Casualty Co., 213 N.Y.S. 649
(1925). Textual discussion of the point may be found in Appelman, Insurance Law
and Practice, VoL 8, Ch. 201, p. 220.
